Meet in the Middle

March 13, 2019

My optimizations

F	:	4
Sbox	:	26
Sbox 8-bit	:	12
Sbox 16-bit	:	12
Round function	:	14
Next roundkey	:	6
Encrypt	:	318
Encrypt unrolled	:	314

Last week's exercise

Handle	L	Sbox	Key sched	Round function	Tot	СРВ
eraneran_v	4	12	6	14	314	39
lktrdfrakacn	8	24	-	34	504	63
dsglsdbijpjk	4	26	-	34	506	63
eszahmekaopa	4	26	-	34	506	63

Sbox


Sbox cont.

```
inline uint64_t apply_sbox8(uint64_t word){
    uint8_t block;
    int i;
    uint64_t word_new;
    word_new = 0;
    int shift = 0;
    for(i=0; i < 8; i++){</pre>
        word_new |= SBOX8[word & OxFF] << shift;</pre>
        word >>= 8;
        shift += 8;
    }
    return word_new;
}
```

Last week's exercise (cont.)

- Use inttypes.h or stdint.h (uint32_t, uint64_t, etc.)
- In/output to the system is hexadecimal (and without the 0x)
- I linked to a makefile tutorial on the website.
- Try all optimization levels, can sometimes save you some cycles.
- Try combining operations, for TC01 I combined two 4-bit sboxes into an 8-bit sbox.
- You can also combine the linear layer and the sboxes (did not try).
- Use the reference implementation to check your own implementation.
- Please hand in reports in pdf format (I do not have Word).
- If you have any problems with the exercise, please ask questions!

MitM on 2DES (or 2AES)



Schoolbook MitM implementation on 2AES/2DES/2ETC


```
Algorithm 1 MitM attack
  For a plaintext ciphertext pair: (p, m)
  Instantiate Hashmap H
  for k_1 \in K do
    c' = E_{k_1}(p)
    H[c'] = k_1
  end for
  for k_2 \in K do
    c' = D_{k_2}(c)
    if c' \in H then
       Output (H[c'], k_2) as a probable key.
    end if
  end for
```

Questions

Questions

- What is the running time of this attack?
- What is the memory consumption? Peak/Sustained?
- How many pairs do we need?

MitM



- Divide the cipher into two sub-ciphers E¹ and E² (and D¹, D² for decryption).
- Compute $c'_1 = E^1_{k_1}(p)$ for each $k_1 \in K_1$.
- Compute $c'_2 = D^2_{k_2}(p)$ for each $k_2 \in K_2$.
- If $c'_1 = c'_2$, then k_1 and k_2 are probable keys.

Schoolbook MitM implementation

Algorithm 2 MitM attack

```
For a plaintext ciphertext pair: (p, m)
for k_1 \in K_1 do
  c' = E_{k_1}(p)
  H[c'] = k_1
end for
for k_2 \in K_2 do
  c' = D_{k_2}(c)
  if c' \in H then
     Output (H[c'], k_2) as a probable key.
  end if
end for
```

Questions

Questions

- What is the running time of this attack?
- What is the memory consumption? Peak/Sustained?
- How many pairs do we need?

Schoolbook MitM implementation (2)

```
Algorithm 3 MitM attack
  For a plaintext ciphertext pair: (p, m)
  for k_c \in K_1 \cap K_2 do
     Instantiate Hashmap H
     for k_1 \in K_1 \setminus K_2 do
        c' = E_{k_1 + k_c}(p)
        H[c'] = k_1
     end for
     for k_2 \in K_2 \setminus K_1 do
        c' = D_{k_2+k_c}(c)
        if c' \in H then
           Output (k_c, H[c'], k_2) as a probable key.
        end if
     end for
  end for
```

Questions

Questions

- What is the running time of this attack?
- What is the memory consumption? Peak/Sustained?
- How many pairs do we need?


Finding MitM attacks (by hand)

- ▶ For every key-bit/cell find the influence after *r* rounds.
- ▶ Find partial key sets K₁ and K₂ s.t. we have at least one common known bit in the middle

TC03

TC03 is a Feistel network with a block size of 8 bits, and a key size of 32-bit.

Round Function $F'(w) = ((w \ll 1)\&(w \ll 2)) \oplus w$ Key Schedule $K = k_0 |k_1|k_2|k_3| \dots |k_{15}$ The *i*-th round key is given by: $rk_i = k_{(i \mod 16)}$



Breaking TC03

Questions?

- How many rounds can we break of TC03?
- How many rounds of TC03 can we break practically?
- How to increase/decrease the resistance against MitM attacks?

MitM attack

Given we have found a MitM attack which guesses n_1 and n_2 key bits for the two partial ciphers and without loss of generality we assume that $n_1 < n_2$.

Forward Phase

- We have to build a filter, mapping 2ⁿ¹ words of size n₁ + n₂ bits to words of n₁ bits. Thus, mapping word to key.
- This takes 2ⁿ¹ · I time, where I is the time to insert an element into the filter.
- This takes $O(2^{n_1} \cdot (n_2 + n_1))$ memory.

Backward Phase

- For each key guess in the backward phase we have to retrieve a value from the filter.
- This takes 2ⁿ² · R time, where R is the time needed to retrieve a value from the filter.

Implementing MitM attacks

When implementing a MitM attack, there are three parts:

- Fast computation of the partial encryption/decryption
- Storing a filter
- Querying a filter
- There are also two limiting factors:
 - Time complexity
 - Memory complexity

Partial encryption/decryption

- ► Expand 'key' into roundkeys → Fast key enumeration/schedule.
 - By using the key schedule.
 - Use an expansion function to expand masks and a value to round keys.
- Not computing the full state, but only a partial state.
- ► Fast implementation of the cipher.

Size of the filter

For effective filtering we need to have a properly sized filter. Given that we guess n_1 keybits in the forward direction and n_2 keybits in the backward direction the filter word size w needs to be at least:

 $w = n_1 + n_2$

bits.

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Proof.

The probability of two random *w*-bit words being the same is 2^{-w} . Thus the probability that two random keys in the forward and backward direction produce the same *w*-bit state is: 2^{-w} . Since we are trying $2^{n_1+n_2}$ combinations of keys we get:

$$2^{n_1} \cdot 2^{n_2} \cdot 2^{-w} = 1$$

$$2^{n_1 + n_2 - w} = 1$$

$$n_1 + n_2 - w = 0$$

$$n_1 + n_2 = w$$

Storing a filter

We guess n_1 bits in the forward direction and n_2 bits in the backward direction. As seen before the filter word size is: $w = n_1 + n_2$ bits.

- Create a (hash)map H with 2ⁿ¹ elements mapping w-bit states to n₁-bit keys.
- For every key $k_1 \in \{0 \dots 2^{n_1}\}$ set $H[E'_{k_1}(p)] = H[E'_{k_1}(p)] + k_1$

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- Given a machine with 2^{40} bits of RAM and C = 1 what can we do?

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- Given a machine with 2^{40} bits of RAM and C = 1 what can we do?

<i>n</i> ₁	<i>n</i> ₂	W	RAM (bits)
20	44	2 ^{26.4}	0.01GB
24	40	2 ^{30.4}	0.17GB
28	36	2 ^{34.4}	2.83GB
32	32	2 ^{38.6}	52GB
36	28	2 ^{42.6}	549GB

Storing a filter (2)

- We can choose not to store the forward key this saves a factor n₁.
- If $w < 2 \cdot n_1$ we can store a bit array of size 2^w .
- We can use an ordinary list to store the (filter, key) pairs and sort after filling.
- Etc.

Questions

- Can we match on smaller than $(n_1 + n_2)$ -bit words?
- What is the lower bound on memory if $n_1 = 32$ and $n_2 = 20$?
- And what is the lower bound for $n_1 = n_2 = 32$?

For next week

- Do this weeks exercise.
- Send me an email with what processor you have and the amount of RAM.

Office hours?